Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Wendell L. Butcher, Irene B. Butcher v. Frank K.
Gilroy, R.G.H., Inc. : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marcus G. Theodore; Attorney for Appellants.
James R. Holbrook; Steven E. Tyler; Russell C. Kearl; Callister and Nebeker; Attorneys for
Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Butcher v. Gilroy, No. 860111.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/911

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
K FU
50
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

A1Q

DOCKET NO.

%yo\ll-r.A

* * * * * * * *

WENDELL L. BUTCHER and
IRENE B. BUTCHER,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
No-

vs.

20592

8bOU|-Ck

FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H.,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants and
Respondents.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS FRANK K. GILROY AND R.G.H., INC.

Appeal from the Order of the
Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah,
Hon. John A. Rokich, Judge

Marcus G. Theodore
Suite 701 - /alley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)359-8 622
Attorney for Appellants

James R. Holbrook
Steven E. Tyler
Russell C, Kearl
CALLISTER & NEBEKER
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530- •7300
Attorneys for Respondents
IF 535 * 1 H

MHHer:

JUL 2 51985
Clerk, Supreme Court, Hi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

WENDELL L. BUTCHER and
IRENE B. BUTCHER,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
No. 20592
vs .
FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H.,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants and
Respondents.
* * * * * * *

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS FRANK K. GILROY AND R.G.H., INC,

Appeal from the Order of the
Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah,
Hon. John A. Rokich, Judge

Marcus G. Theodore
Suite 701 - /alley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)359-8 622
Attorney for Appellants

James R. Holbrook
Steven E. Tyler
Russell C. Kearl
CALLISTER & NEBEKER
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

2

STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

9

ARGUMENTS
I.

II.

11
The Order Granting R.G.H., Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss Should Be Affirmed;
The Amended Complaint Sets Forth No Claim
Against R.G.H., Inc. At All

The Order Granting Respondents' Joint
Motion To Dismiss Should Be Affirmed;
The Butchers' Action Is Barred By The
Shatute Of Limitations

III. Gilroy's Sale Of The Property In March, 1982,
Does Not Extend The Time During Which
Appellants May Properly Bring This Suit
IV.

V.

VI.

4

12

17

Gilroy's Alleged Failure To Notify Butchers
Of The 1982 Sale Does Not Provide Basis For
Estoppel Or Equitable Tolling Of Limitations
Statute

24

Appellants Have Repeatedly Failed To
Comply With The Utah Ruled Of Appellate
Procedure In The Attempted Prosecution
Of This Appeal

27

The Butchers' Allegations That Gilroy
Was Absent From The State Are Not
Properly Before The Court

36

i

VII. The Butchers1 Election To Appeal Rather
Than To Amend Their Complaint Operates
As A Waiver Of Any Reliance On Gilroy's
Purported Absence

39

CONCLUSION

40

ADDENDUM

43

li

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Production
Credit Association, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978)
Bryan v. Stillwater Board of Realtors,
578 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir. 1977)

37
6

Byron v. University of Florida, 403 F. Supp.
49 (N.D. Fla. 1975)

38

Condo v. Mulcahiz, 88 A.D.2d 497,
454 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982)

13

Cox Construction Co. v. State Road Commission,
588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978)

12

Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho
734, 536 P.2d 729 (1975)

15

Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp.,
667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1982)

14, 22, 23, 24

Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1980)
Good v. Ehrlich, 67 Kan. 94, 72 P. 545 (1903)

37
18, 19

Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45 P.2d 565 (1935). .18, 19, 20
Howarth v. First National Bank of Anchorage,
540 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1975)
Jablons v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677
(9th Cir. 1978)
Kaiser Aluminum v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,
677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied,
459 U.S. 1105 (1983)

14, 16
38

38

Kincheloe v. Farmer, 214 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1954),
cert, denied, 348 U.S. 920 (1955)

38

Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P. 1038 (1896)

40

i ii

L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Construction Co.,
608 P.2d 626 (Utah 1980)
Millerberg v. Steadman, 645 P.2d 602 (Utah 1982)

12, 13
13

Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc.,
573 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978)
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981)
Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2 of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
452 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied,
406 U.S. 946 (1972)
North Star International v. Arizona Corp. Commission,
720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1983)
Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22,

39
25, 26

37
38

456 P.2d 159 (1969)

27

Riess v. Murchison, 503 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1974)

16

Robinson v. Utah State Department of Natural Resources,
620 P.2d 519 (Utah 1980)

13

State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983)

34

State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177,
100 P.2d 575 (1940)

14

Strand v. Associated Students, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). . . .37
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead
592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979)
Uckerman v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.,

13

588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978)

33

Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1983)

25

Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978)

26

White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Service
IV
Commission,
P.2d
, 9 U.A.R. 9
(Utah, decided May 2, 1985)

34, 35

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1977)

17, 18, 19, 20, 21

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (1977) .

2, 14

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1977)

3, 14

Court Rules
Rule 6, Utah R. App. Proc

28

Rule 9, Utah R. App. Proc

28, 29, 30

Rule 11, Utah R. App. Proc

30, 31, 32

Rule 24, Utah R. App. Proc

32, 33, 35

Rule 75, Utah R. App. Proc. (repealed)

32

Rule 8, Utah R. Civ. Proc.

11

Rule 9, Utah R. Civ. Proc

38

Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. Proc
Rule 2(i), Third District Rules of Practice

12, 37
37

Treatises
Corbin on Contracts § 946 (one vol. ed. 1952)

16

Other Authorities
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281 (1981)

13

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 312 (1981)

15

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 313(1) (1981)

15

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 236(1) (1981)

15

15A C.J.S. Compromise Sc Settlement § 49 (1967)

13

54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 125 (1948)

16

v

Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 605 (1964)

13

Utah Court Rules Annotated 287 (1985 ed.)

29

Black's Law Dictionary 1334 (5th ed. 1979)

36

CN0391K

VI

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether as pleaded in the Complaint, the Butchers'

claims for breach by Gilroy of an agreement between the parties
is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to
written obligations;

2.

Whether Gilroy's sale of property to R.G.H. Inc. in

March, 1982 constituted a "payment" under the parties'
agreement within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44
(1977) .

STATUTES

This appeal addresses the district court's application of
the six-year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23
(1977) which reads as follows:

78-12-23.
years

Within six years.--Within six

(1) An action for the mesne profits of real
property.
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing, except those mentioned in the
preceding section [78-12-22],

- 2 -

Reference is also made to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1977)
which reads as follows:

78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions
generally.—Civil actions can be commenced
only within the periods prescribed in this
chapter, after the cause of action shall
have accrued, except where in special cases
a different limitation is prescribed by
statute.

The plaintiff-appellants have asserted Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-12-44 (1977) as a basis for avoiding the bar of the
statute of limitations.

That section reads as follows:

78-12-44 . Payment—Acknowledgement — Promise
to pay extends period.—In any case founded
on contract, when any part of the principal
or interest shall have been paid, or an
acknowledgment of an existing liability,
debt or claim, or any promise to pay the
same, shall have been made, an action may be
brought within the period prescribed for the
same after such payment, acknowledgment or
promise; but such acknowledgment or promise
must be in writing, signed by the party to
be charge thereby. When a right of action
is barred by the provisions of any statute
it shall be unavailable either as a cause of
action or ground of defense.

In addition, the application of Rules 9, 11,

and 24 of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to the prosecution of this

- 3 -

appeal may prove dispositive.

These rules are reproduced as

Exhibits "E", "F", and "G" of the Addendum.

For the

convenience of this Court, Rules 8, 9 and 12(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, have been included as Exhibits "H", "I" and
"J" of the Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action in which Wendell and Irene Butcher
("Butchers") sought damages and/or an accounting arising from
Frank Gilroy's alleged breach of contract, specifically a
settlement agreement arising out of a prior lawsuit.

See

Settlement Agreement, annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" of the
Addendum, R. at 37-41.

The original Complaint, filed on March

26, 1984, see R. at 2-11, was the subject of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss raising the bar of the statute of
limitations.

See R. at 16-17.

On August 13, 1984, the

Butchers moved to amend their Complaint, see R. at 22, which
was stipulated to by counsel and ordered by the Court.

See R.

at 43, 45-46; Amended Complaint, annexed hereto as Exhibit "B"
of the Addendum, R. at 34-42.

On November 19, 1984, R.G.H.,

Inc. filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that
the Amended Complaint asserted no claim against it, see R. at

- 4 -

47, and joined in a similar motion filed that day by Gilroy
seeking a dismissal grounded upon the statute of limitations.
See R. at 49, 51-57.

A series of memoranda were filed, and the

District Court, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding, heard
the motions on February 25, 1985.

See R. at 64-66, 67-72,

74-76, 79.

On March 13, 1985 the District Court entered orders
granting both motions to dismiss, true and correct copies of
which are annexed hereto as Exhibits "C" and "D" of the
Addendum.

See R. at 80-83.

On April 1, 1985, counsel for the Butchers filed a Notice
of Appeal with the Clerk of the Third District Court,
accompanied by two documents, entitled "Docketing Statement"
and "Designation of Record on Appeal," respectively.

See R. at

84-91.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following statement of facts is derived from the
Amended Complaint filed in this action, whose factual
allegations are to be taken as correct for the purposes of the
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Rule 12(b)(6) motions and this appeal.

See e.g., Bryan v.

Stillwater Board of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1319, 1321 (10th Cir.
1977).

1.

"On or about October 18, 1971, Wendell L. Butcher,

Irene B. Butcher, and Frank K. Gilroy stipulated to an entry of
an order and judgment as Civil No. 179775.

As part of the

stipulation, a settlement agreement attached hereto as Exhibit
A. was entered into.

Frank K. Gilroy was to hold title to 33

acres surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the
requirement in paragraph 6 that he sell the property by April,
1976 for the best price attainable and the proceeds be
apportioned with 32% paid to the [Butchers] and 68% to
[Gilroy]."

2.

Amended Complaint at 1f 4, R. at 34.

"[The Butchers] and Frank K. Gilroy attempted to sell

the property over the years but because of various subdivision
development changes and watershed questions, the parties were
delayed in selling the property."

Amended Complaint at 1f 5, R.

at 34-35.

3.

"On or about March 8, 1982, within six years of the

performance sale date of April, 1976, Frank K. Gilroy sold the
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property in question to R.G.H., Inc. without notifying [the
Butchers] or accounting to them for their share of the
proceeds."

4.

Amended Complaint at 1f 6, R. at 35.

"[The Butchers] continued to attempt to sell the

property and periodically notified Frank K. Gilroy of their
progress in this regard.

Frank K. Gilroy at no time notified

plaintiffs that he had sold the property, and continued to
encourage [the Butchers] in their efforts to find a buyer and
acquire the necessary building permits from Salt Lake City.
Based upon Frank K. Gilroy's representation and assurances that
he was also trying to perform the contract, [the Butchers]
continued to attempt to sell the property and work with the
city to obtain permits for the property."

Amended Complaint at

1f 7, R. at 35.

5.

"To date, Frank K. Gilroy has failed to account to

[the Butchers] or pay them the amounts due and owing under the
stipulated agreement as was repeatedly promised."

Amended

Complaint at 1f 8, R. at 35.

6.

R.G.H., Inc. and Gilroy dispute the assertion in the

Butchers' statement of facts that "[t]he settlement agreement
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required both appellants and respondents to use their best
efforts to sell the 34 acres and divide the proceeds
proportionately."

Butcher Brief at 2.

The "Settlement

Agreement" attached to the Amended Complaint specifically
provides that "such sale or disposition shall be conducted by
Gilroy at a price to be determined by Gilroy in his
discretion."

See "Settlement Agreement" attached to Amended

Complaint at If 6, R. at 39.

Furthermore, the Amended Complaint

specifically states that Gilroy "was to hold title to 33 acres
surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the requirement in
paragraph 6 that he sell the property by April 1976 . . . ."
See Amended Complaint 1f 4, at R. 34.

Therefore, neither the

Amended Complaint nor the "Settlement Agreement" annexed
thereto reflect the requirement asserted by the brief.
at 34-42.

See R.

In addition, the Butchers make no reference to the

pages of the original record in support of any factual
assertion in their brief, all in violation of Rule 24(e), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

See Part V, infra.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.

The Butchers' Amended Complaint pleaded no cause of

action whatsoever against R.G.H., Inc.

Where a complaint seeks

no relief against a named party defendant, it plainly fails to
state a claim against that defendant upon which relief may be
granted.

2.

The settlement agreement at issue between the parties

is properly treated as an executory accord and its enforcement
is determined through application of contract law principles.
The Butchers' claim against Gilroy arises out of his total
breach of his duty of performance under the parties' agreement,
which occurred when he failed to sell the property in question
in April 1976.

The Butchers' claim accrued at that time and

was barred six years later by the statute of limitations.

3.

Nothing about Gilroy's sale of the property to R.G.H.,

Inc. in March, 1982 operates to extend the time in which the
Butchers could commence their action.

Gilroy made no "payment"

to the Butchers which would toll the statute of limitations
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44; nor did the sale itself come
within the language of that section.

- 9 -

The facts of total breach

by Gilroy and the Butchers* knowledge of those facts were
complete in April of 1976.

4.

Any non-disclosure by Gilroy of the 1982 sale was

immaterial to the Butchers' prospective action against Gilroy
for his total breach in 1976.

The fact of the ultimate sale

was not a fact necessary to the Butchers' determination
following April, 1976 that a cause of action existed.

5.

The correctness of the rulings by the district court

below should be presumed by this Court as a consequence of the
Butchers* total failure to support the factual allegations in
their brief by citation to the record, their failure to file a
docketing statement in compliance with Rule 9 requirements,
their failure to follow Rule 11 requirements regarding
preparation of a transcript, among other rule violations.

6.

The Butchers' argument, raised in their brief, that

the statute of limitations should be tolled due to Gilroy's
purported absence from the state, is not supported by any
well-pleaded facts in their Amended Complaint and is not
properly before this Court.

The allegation finds no support in

the record.
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7.

The Butchers did not amend their complaint to include

any allegation of Gilroy's absence from the state either
following the respondent's first motion to dismiss based upon
the statute of limitations, or following Judge Rokich's order
of dismissal, which had allowed them additional leave to
amend.

Their election to appeal rather than to amend waives

any reliance upon Gilroy's absence as a basis for tolling the
statute of limitations.

It was not properly at issue before

the court below or this Court on review.

ARGUMENTS

I.

THE ORDER GRANTING R.G.H., INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED; THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SETS FORTH NO CLAIM
AGAINST R.G.H., INC. AT ALL.

Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that a
pleading setting forth a claim for relief "shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the
relief to which he deems himself entitled."

This requirement

is amplified by Rule 8(e)(1), which demands that "[ejach
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct."

- 11 -

The Appellants' Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts
stating any claim for legal or equitable relief against R.G.H.,
Inc.

See copy of Amended Complaint annexed hereto as Exhibit

"B" of the Addendum; R. at 34-42.

In fact, the prayer for

relief makes no mention whatsoever of R.G.H., Inc. See R. 35-36.

In the most literal and absolute sense, the Amended
Complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted" against R.G.H., Inc. See Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The District Court's order granting R.G.H.'s

Motion to Dismiss should be affirmed.

II. THE ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED; THE BUTCHERS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A.

Settlement Agreement is an Executory Accord Governed
by Contract Law Principles.

Recent decisions of this Court have established that "an
agreement of compromise and settlement in a legal dispute
constitutes an executory accord."

L&A Drywall, Inc. v.

Whitmore Construction Co.,, 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980)
(footnote omitted); accord, Cox Construction Co. v. State Road
Commission., 583 P.2d 85 (Utah 1978).
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As such, a party to the agreement aggrieved
by an alleged breach thereof by the other
party has the option of seeking to enforce
the settlement agreement, or regarding the
agreement as rescinded and moving against
the other party on the underlying claim.

L&A Drywall, Inc., 608 P.2d at 629 (footnote omitted).

In this

case, the Butchers decisively elected to seek enforcement of
the Settlement Agreement in an independent proceeding.

See

also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281 (1981).

As such, the express terms of the Settlement Agreement
should be construed and enforced as would be the provisions of
other written contracts.

See e.g., Condo v. Mulcahey, 88

A.D.2d 497, 454 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982); cf. Millerberg v.
Steadman, 645 P.2d 602 (Utah 1982); Robinson v. Utah State
Department, of Natural Resources, 620 P.2d 519 (Utah 1980);
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605
(Utah 1979).

The rules governing contract actions are applied

to actions for breach of compromise or settlement agreements,
including such matters as laches or limitations. See 15A C.J.S.
Compromise & Settlement § 4 9 (19 6 7); see also Annot., 94
A.L.R.2d 605 (1964).
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B.

The Butchers' Action Arises from Breach of the Terms
of a Contract and is Barred by the Statute of
Limitations.

The applicable statute of limitations provides that an
action based on a written contract must be commenced within six
years after the cause of action has accrued.
§§ 78-12-1; 78-12-23(2) (1977).

Utah Code Ann.

It is well established that

the statute of limitations begins to run at the moment a cause
of action arises and the prospective plaintiff gains the right
to apply to the courts for remedy.

E.g., Fredericksen v.

Knight Land Corporation, 667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1982); State Tax
Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 181-82, 100 P.2d 575,
577 (Utah 1940) .

Likewise, the general rule follows that where the period
for performance of the contract is fixed, the right of action
accrues and the statute begins to run at the expiration of that
period.

See, e.g., Howarth v. First National Bank of

Anchorage, 540 P.2d 486, 490-91 (Alaska 1975) ("[A] cause of
action for breach of contract accrues as soon as the promisor
fails to do the thing contracted for, and the statute of
limitations begins to run at such time.")

"A breach of

contract is a non-performance of any contractual duty of
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immediate performance,M Restatement of Contracts § 312; see
Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 536 P.2d 729, 735
(1975).

Thus, the six-year limitations period applicable to

this action began running in April, 1976 when Gilroy failed to
perform; in April, 1982, that statute became a complete bar to
this action.

The obligation of Gilroy to sell the property and
distribute its proceeds in April, 1976 represented the whole of
Gilroy*s remaining performance due under the agreement.

As

explained by the Restatement of Contracts § 313(1), " [a] total
breach of contract is a breach where remedial rights provided
by law are substituted for all the existing contractual rights,
or can be so substituted by the injured party."

Where the

"remedial rights provided by law" can be so substituted, the
cause of action necessarily accrues, triggering the running of
the applicable limitations period.

"A claim for total breach

is one for damages based on all the injured party's remaining
rights to performance."
§ 236(1) (1981).

Restatement (Second) of Contracts

"[I]t is clear that, whenever the court will

hold that A's breach is a total breach, B can regard A's
performance as at an end and at once maintain action for
damages for all of his injury, past, present and future."

- 15 -

Corbin on Contracts § 946 at 926 (one vol. ed. 1952); see e.g.,
Riess v. Murchison, 503 F.2d 499, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1974).
Where one party is in total breach of his contractual
commitments then remaining, the law neither requires the
injured party to delay his action until defendant attempts to
cure the breach, nor tolls the statute of limitations until he
does.

Nothing prevented the Butchers from bringing an action

against Gilroy when the April 1976 "performance date"—as the
Complaint terms it — passed without the sale of the property.

The statute commences operation at the time of the breach,
i.e., the failure to perform, rather than when actual damages
are sustained as a consequence.
at 490-91.

E.g. Howarth, supra, 540 P.2d

See also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 125

(1948) (The statute of limitations begins to run when the
contract is broken and the amount or kind of damage which a
plaintiff claims and which may be recoverable by him on the
breach is immaterial.)

Gilroy's failure to perform by April

1976—not the ultimate sale of the property in 1982—was the
operative event triggering the running of the limitations
period.

- 16 -

III. GILROY'S SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN MARCH OF 1982 DOES NOT
EXTEND THE TIME DURING WHICH APPELLANTS MAY PROPERLY BRING
THIS SUIT.

The Respondent Gilroy sold the real property which was the
subject of the Settlement Agreement in March, 1982.

That sale,

made years after Gilroy's total breach of the Settlement
Agreement, cannot extend the time during which the Butchers may
rightfully bring suit on the breach of obligations arising from
that agreement.

A.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 Does Not Extend Limitations
Period in this Case.

The Butchers argued below and in their Brief that Gilroy's
receipt of payment from R.G.H., Inc. in 1982 constitutes a
"payment" which operates to toll the statute of limitations
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (1978).

That section

provides:

— I n any case founded on contract, when any
part of the principal or interest shall have
been paid, or an acknowledgment of an
existing liability, debt or claim, or any
promise to pay the same, shall have been
made, an action may be brought within the
period prescribed for the same after such
payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such
acknowledgment or promise must be in

- 17 -

writing, signed by the party to be charged
thereby. When a right of action is barred
by the provisions of any statute, it shall
be unavailable either as a cause of action
or ground of defense. [Emphasis added.]

Appellants' reliance on that statute to support their argument,
however, is inappropriate.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 was originally based upon and is
similar to a Kansas statute.
387, 45 P.2d 565 (1935).

See Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah

In construing their statute, the

Kansas Supreme Court stated:

While the language of the statute is that a
part payment shall operate to toll the
limitations, it certainly cannot be
understood to mean that such part payment
made by any one at any time for any purpose
would so operate; and it is well recognized
in the books that such payment must be made
by the obligor against whom the statute is
sought to be tolled, or by someone at his
direction, and made as a part payment of the
debt, under such circumstances as to amount
to an acknowledgment of an existing
liability.

Good v. Ehrlich, 67 Kan. 94, 72 P. 545, 546 (1903) (emphasis
added).

Quoting Wood on Limitations, § 97, the Court continued:
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In order to make a money payment a part
payment within the statute, it must be shown
to be a payment of a portion of an admitted
debt, and paid to and accepted by the
creditor as such, accompanied by
circumstances amounting to an absolute and
unqualified acknowledgment of more being
due, from which a promise may be inferred to
pay the remainder.

Id., 72 P. at 546 (emphasis added).

(In Good v. Erlich, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that
collection under a promissory note from a third party pledgee
did not constitute a "payment" for purposes of tolling the
statute of limitations against the principal debtor.)

The Utah Supreme Court has followed the approach expressed
in Good v. Ehrlich in construing Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44.

In

Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 45 P.2d 565 (1935), the Court,
in construing a statute identical to Section 78-12-44, stated:

The great weight of authority is to effect
that a part payment of either principal or
interest by one of two or more joint and
several obligors does not of itself suspend
the running of the statute of limitations
against the other co-obligors . . . .
The
reason for this rule is that joint and
several or joint obligors are not
necessarily the agent of each other and are
not authorized to suspend the running of the
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statute, one as against the other, merely
because of that relationship; that the
payment contemplated by the statute as
tolling its effect must be one made by the
party himself or by some one authorized by
him to make it. The reason is well
illustrated by the following language from
the case of Marienthal v. Mosler, 16 Ohio
St. 566, at page 570, in construing a
statute identical in language to our Section
104-2-45: "It will be seen, however, that
the same effect is given to such part
payment as is given to a written promise
'signed by the party charged thereby.' It
would seem, therefore, from analogy, that
the payment must be made by the party to be
affected thereby, or by an agent authorized
for that express purpose. In the
contemplation of the statute, the part
payment of a debt is regarded as evidence of
a willingness and obligation to pay the
residue, as conclusive as would be a
personal written promise to that effect. It
could not, then, have been intended to give
this effect to payments other than those
made by the party himself, or under his
immediate direction. Surely nothing short
of this would warrant the assumption of a
willingness to pay equal to his written
promise to that effect."

Holloway v. Wetzel, 86 Utah 387, 391-92 45 P.2d 565, 568
(1935)

citation omitted).

It is evident therefore, that before Section 78-12-44 can
be applicable to extend a statute of limitations, the following
conditions must be satisfied:

(1) partial payment of either

principal or interest due under a contract must be made, (2) by
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the obligor under that contract, and (3) the payment must be
made to the creditor under that contract.

None of these

conditions has been satisfied in the present case.

R.G.H.,

Inc.'s payment to Gilroy arose from the sale of the property to
Gilroy, not out of the "agreement" between the Butchers and
Gilroy.

Had the Respondent Gilroy made some payment in 1982 Jto the
Butchers, Section 78-12-44 might offer some aid.

It is

impossible, however, to infer from R.G.H., Inc.'s payment to
Gilroy any renewed promise by Gilroy to pay any amount to the
Butchers.

If Section 78-12-44 adds anything to this case, it can only
add support to the ruling of the court below.

To the extent

that one may read the Amended Complaint to allege that Gilroy
in some way acknowledged or promised to perform the contract
following breach through "representations and assurances that
he was also trying to perform the contract," Amended Complaint
at 1f 7, R. at 35, the express language of Section 78-12-44
forbids extension of the time for filing of the Butchers'
lawsuit.

To have such an effect, the new "acknowledgment or
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promise must be in. writing, signed by the party to be charged
thereby-M

16.

(emphasis added).

The Butchers have pleaded no written promise or
acknowledgment signed by Gilroy reestablishing his duty to
perform under the contract following the April 1976 breach.

B.

Case Law Relied Upon by Appellants Does Not Support
Extension of the Limitations Period in this Case.

Both in memorandum below and in their brief on appeal, the
Butchers rely upon Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 687 P.2d
34 (Utah 1983), as precedent for maintaining this action.
Fredericksen, however, is readily distinguishable on its
facts.

In that case, the plaintiff claimed entitlement to a

share of proceeds from the sale of a number of parcels of land,
which share was due whenever a parcel was sold.

The parties

set no deadlines or dates for the sale as a specific term of
their contract.

Fredricksen's claims for proceeds simply

accrued each time another parcel was sold.

In contrast, the Settlement Agreement in this case
expressly set an 18-month (April, 1976) deadline for Gilroy to
sell the property and distribute proceeds.
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Unlike the

Fredericksen transactions, which were divisible into separate
breaches accruing upon sale of each parcel, Gilroy was
contractually bound to sell only one parcel.

His failure to do

so by April, 1976 was a total breach of the Agreement.

The

Butchers' cause of action arose at that time.

As this Court observed in Fredericksen:

The statute of limitations begins to run at
the moment that a cause of action arises.
See, e.g., Ash v. State, Utah 572 P.2d 1374
(1977); Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189,
259 P. 313 (1927). 'Ordinarily, a cause of
action for a debt begins to run when the
debt is due and payable because at that time
an action can be maintained to enforce it.'
O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 357, 463
P.2d 799, 800 (1970) (quoting State Tax
Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177,
182, 100 P.2d 525, 577 (1940). See also
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety
Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1972) (stating
that in a breach of contract action the
statute of limitations ordinarily begins to
run when the breach occurs).

Id., 667 P.2d at 36.

Breach of the contract in this case was

complete when April, 1976 passed without sale of the property.
Gilroy was at that time obligated to sell and distribute a
share of the proceeds from that sale to the Butchers.

At that

moment, Gilroy became liable to the Butchers for breach of
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contract and, according to Fredericksen, the statute of
limitations commenced to run.

The Butchers cannot now prevail simply by reading the
material terms out of the contract.

The limitations period with respect to Gilroy's breach of
the agreement expired in April of 1982.

The Butchers did not

commence their action until March of 1984, almost two full
years after the applicable statute of limitations had expired.
Neither the sale of the Property to R.G.H., Inc. in March of
1982 nor Gilroy's receipt of payment for the Property tolled or
otherwise extended the statute of limitations for an action
from Gilroy's alleged April, 1976 breach, as the Court below
correctly ruled.

IV. GILROY'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO NOTIFY BUTCHERS OF THE 1982
SALE DOES NOT PROVIDE BASIS FOR ESTOPPEL OR EQUITABLE
TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS STATUTE.

Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Gilroy was
required to sell the property by April, 1976 and deliver 32% of
the proceeds to the Butchers.

When the property was not sold
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in April, 1976, both the Butchers and Gilroy had actual and
complete knowledge that the agreement had been breached.

The Butchers' Amended Complaint does not allege facts
sufficient to support any equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations, or estoppel of Gilroy or R.G.H. to raise that
defense.

As set forth in Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86

(Utah 1981), "the general rule is that a cause of action
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action."
omitted).

_Id. , 635 P.2d at 86 (footnote

Accord, Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 608 (10th

Cir. 1983).

In a contract action, the cause of action accrues

upon breach of the contract.

Utah law recognizes three exceptions to this general rule
under which the running of the statute of limitations does not
begin to run when the cause of action normally "accrues."
These exceptions are found where:

1.

Commencement of the limitations period is

postponed by legislation;
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2.

Exceptional circumstances make application of the

general rule irrational or unjust; or

3.

The defendant has concealed or misrepresented one

or more facts necessary to a determination that a cause of
action exists.

Myers, 635 P.2d at 86.

None of these exceptions apply to this case.

The Butchers

knew of the breach of contract by Gilroy at and after the time
of the breach in April, 1976.

Although the Butchers allege

that Gilroy concealed the fact that the property had been sold
in 1982, this fact was not necessary to a determination by the
Butchers that a cause of action against Gilroy existed
beginning in April of 1976 for breach of the Settlement
Agreement.

Every fact needed to plead that cause of action was

known to the Butchers from and after that time.

This case is easily distinguished from cases such as
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978), in
which plaintiffs did not know the cause of damage to their
property caused by seeping water and relied on a county
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official's knowingly false representation that a county storm
drain was not leaking into their property.

Nowhere does the

Complaint allege that Gilroy made repeated promises to the
Butchers, that they would in fact be paid, as did the insurance
agent in Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 26-28,
456 P.2d 159, 163 (1969).

The Butchers' naked assertion in the brief that
"respondents repeatedly promised to try to sell the property to
prevent appellant from suing," Butcher Brief at 4, finds no
support either in the allegations of the Amended Complaint, see
R. at 34-35, or in any competent evidence in the record.

No

citation to the record is made by the Butchers, leaving this
Court properly to assume the correctness of the court's ruling
below.

V.

See Part V, infra.

APPELLANTS HAVE REPEATEDLY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN THE ATTEMPTED PROSECUTION
OF THIS APPEAL.

From the outset, the Butchers' prosecution of this appeal
has been marred by their repeated failure to comply with the
requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

While

some of the violations of the rules appear technical in nature,
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others are of material importance and prejudicial effect-

The

cumulative effect of the Butchers* delinquencies frustrates and
impairs the appeal process as envisioned by the new Rules, all
to the prejudice of respondents Gilroy and R.G.H., Inc.

A.

RULE 6: The Butchers Failed to File a Legally
Sufficient Bond for Costs on Appeal.

Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
that each appellant "shall file with such notice [of appeal] a
bond for costs on appeal . . . The bond shall be in the sum of
at least $300.00, or such greater amount as the district court
may order . . . "

At the time that the Butchers' notice of

appeal was filed, counsel tendered to the clerk the amount of
only $100.00, which was transmitted to this Court.
92.

See R. at

The Butchers have filed no affidavit of impecuniosity

excusing them from compliance with Rule 6.

B.

RULE 9: The Butchers Failed to File a Docketing
Statement With This Court; The Docketing Statement
Served on Respondents Lacked Required Content.

Rule 9(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
each appellant to file a docketing statement with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court within 21 days of the filing of the notice of
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appeal, and that "[a]n original and 7 copies shall be filed,
together with proof of service."

The Butchers had not filed a

docketing statement with this Court as late as July 21, 1985,
weeks after the deadline had passed.

A document entitled "Docketing Statement" appears in the
record below, R. at 84-88, and was served by mail upon Gilroy
and R.G.H., Inc. on March 29, 1985.

Even if deemed to be the

docketing statement required by Rule 9, its content proves
materially deficient in several respects:

(1) it cites Rule

72, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as the "authority believed to
confer jurisdiction" on this Court to hear this appeal,
notwithstanding the fact that the rule had earlier been
repealed, see Utah Court Rules Annotated 287 (1985 ed); (2) it
makes a general conclusory statement of the issue on appeal
notwithstanding the command of Rule 9(c)(5) that such
statements are "not acceptable" and that the issue be
"expressed in terms and circumstances of the case"; and (3) it
failed to include, as an attachment, a copy of the order of the
court below granting the joint motion of Gilroy and R.G.H. to
dismiss, contrary to the requirements of Rule 9(d)(1).
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The Butchers' failure to comply Rule 9's specific
requirements both as to content and filing of the docketing
statement justify the imposition of harsh sections.

Rule 9(e)

expressly provides:

Consequences of Failure to Comply.
Docketing statements which fail to comply
with this Rule will not be accepted.
Failure to comply may result in dismissal of
the appeal or petition.

As the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9 re-emphasizes,
"Paragraph (e) is explicit that a failure to comply with this
Rule may result in dismissal fo the appeal."

C.

RULE 11; The Butchers Failed to Comply With
Requirements Respecting Preparation of Transcript of
the Proceeding Below.

Rule 11(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure imposes
upon each appellant the specific duty to comply with Subparts
(d) and (e) of that Rule.

Rule 11(e) expressly requires the

appellant to request from the court reporter a transcript of
"such parts of the proceedings not already on file as he deems
necessary" within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal.
"If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested,
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within the same period an
to that effect."

appellant shall file a certificate

Rule 11(e)(1), Utah Rule of Appellate

Procedure.

The appellant's duty does not end there.
silence communicates a specific message:

Under Rule 11,

"Unless the entire

transript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10
days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the
issues he intends to present on the appeal and shall serve on
the respondent a copy of the request [for partial transcript]
or certificate [that no transcript is to be requested] and of
the statement."

Failure to serve such notice communicates the

message that the appellant will request a transcript of the
entire proceedings.

As of July 21, 1985, the Butchers had filed no certificate
that a transcript would not be requested; nor did they serve
upon Gilroy or R.G.H., Inc. any statement of intended issues or
of their intent to order less than an entire transcript.

Yet

it appears from the record that no transcript has been ordered
at all.
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The Butchers' complete breach of their duties under Rule
11(e) works directly to the prejudice of Gilroy and R.G.H.,
Inc.

For example, the respondents are unable to refer this

Court directly to points in the hearing record below wherein
they objected to the Butchers' assertion of facts extrinsic to
the Amended Complaint in opposing the respondents' motions to
dismiss.

Under former Rule 75(a)(1), an appellant's failure to
comply with requirements regarding certificates as to
transcripts warranted dismissal of the appeal.

A similar

sanction may prove useful in enforcement of the new Rule.

D.

RULE 24: The Contents of the Butchers' Brief Fail to
Comply With Requirements of Rule 24(a), (d), (e), and

in.
In terms of the requirements of Rule 24, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure with respect to the content of briefs, the
Butchers' brief proves deficient in several respects: (1) it
does not set out in verbatim fashion the statutes that the
Butchers deem to be determinative [Rule 24(a)(5)]; (2) it
defies the Rule's injunction to "keep to a minimum references
to parties by such designations as 'appellant' and
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1

respondent'.M

[Rule 24(d)]; (3) most critically, it wholly

fails to make reference to paging in the original record as
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(b).

Not a single citation to the

record appears in the Butchers' brief [Rule 24(e)]; and (4) the
"Appendix" to the Butchers* brief does not include "[c]opies of
those parts of the record on appeal that are of central
importance to the determination of the appeal (e.g. . . . the
contract or document subject to construction, etc.)," such as
the Amended Complaint or the Settlement Agreement between the
Butchers and Gilroy that is the subject of this action.
(Emphasis added.) [Rule 24(f)].

Particularly as to the requirement that citations be made
to the paginated record on appeal, this Court has steadfastly
refused to review or consider factual issues not directly
identified to the record.

As stated in Uckerman v. Lincoln

National Life Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978), "[t]his
Court need not, and will not, consider any facts no properly
cited to, or supported by, the record."
(applying former Rule 75(p)(2)).
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I_d.

588 P.2d at 144

In State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983), for
example, this Court observed that:

With respect to the first three points set
forth above, the defendant's brief contains
absolutely no references to the trial record
or tanscript to support his factual
allegations. In State v. Tucker, Utah, 657
P.2d 755 (1982), this Court stated: This
Court will assume the correctness of the
judgment below if counsel on appeal does not
comply with the requirements of Rule
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as to making a concise statement
of facts and citation of the pages in the
record where they are supported.
Id., at 757 (citing Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale,
121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952)). See
also, e.g., State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657
P.2d 289 (1982). In accordance with the
rule set forth in State v. Tucker, we will
assume the correctness of the trial court's
judgment.

Id. , 660 P.2d at 253 (footnotes ommitted).

Even more recent

in White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
P.2d

, 9 U.A.R.9 (Utah, decided May 2, 1985), this

Court stated:

Utah Power and Light Co. has provided
no citations to the record in its brief.
Utah R. Civ. P. 75 (p)(2)(2)(d)(superceded
on January I, 1985, by Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(e) and 24(K))
requires that, on appeal, the party must
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make a concise statement of facts and
citation of the pages in the record where
those facts are supported. Failing that,
this Court will assume the correctness of
the judgment below. State v. Steggell,
Utah, 660 P.2d 252 (1983) . . .

Id.

9 U.A.R. at 12 n.1.

Nothing in the text of new Rule 24(e) counsels any
departure from this Court's prior approach, particularly in
cases where the appellant makes no effort to raise his factual
assertions through direct citations to the record as prepared
and indexed under the Rules.

In this case, this Court should assume the correctness of
the district court's rulings, particularly in relation to the
Butchers' assertions in their brief of extrinsic facts
concerning Gilroy's purported concealment of the 1982 sale or
his alleged absence from the jurisdiction at times relevant to
the statute of limitations.

- 35 -

VI. THE BUTCHERS' ALLEGATIONS THAT GILROY WAS ABSENT FROM THE
STATE ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.

At pages 4-5 of the Butchers' Brief, it is argued that:

[tjhere is also a question of fact as to
whether the Gilroys, who maintain a Nevada
residence, were absent from the state to
prevent the tolling of the statute.
Respondents extended stays in Nevada would
delay the tolling of the statute of
limitations, until their return under
Section 78-12-35, U.C.A., 1953 as amended;
see Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915, 15 U.2d.
54 (1964).

Even assuming that the Butchers meant to say that Gilroy's
purported absence prevents the running of the statute of
limitations period rather than its tolling, see Black's Law
Dictionary 1334 (5th ed. 1979), once again the argument is
devoid of citations to the record.

See Part V, supra.

Furthermore, nothing in the Amended Complaint offers any
support for the Butchers' argument; paragraphs 2 and 3 allege
simply tht "Frank K. Gilroy is a resident of the state of Utah
and that "R.G.H., Inc. is a Utah corporation."

R. at 34.

The

factual basis for the district court's rulings is confined to
those allegations found within the four corners of the Amended
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Complaint.

E.g., Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639-40

(2d Cir. 1980).

The court below made no determination to

convert the respondents* motions into motions for summary
judgment under Rule 56 -- the only way that facts extrinsic to
the pleadings could have been considered under Rule
12(b)(6)--and no opportunity was given Gilroy or R.G.H., to
present additional pertinent material as would be required if
the motion was to be so converted.

See Bekins Bar V Ranch v.

Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1978);
Strand v. Associated Students, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977).

Even in the court below the matter was not proffered by
affidavit or competent evidence; there, as here, counsel
asserted the matter as part of a legal argument, see R. at 75,
in a document entitled "Supplemental Reply Memorandum,"—one
not provided for in the Third District Court's Supplementary
Rules of Practice.

See id., Rule 2(i).

Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2 of the Int'l Ass'n of Mach. &
Aero. Workers, 452 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1971), cert, denied
406 U.S. 946 (1972)(Points and authorities do not constitute
matters outside the pleading sufficient to transform a Rule
12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment); Byron v.
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University of Florida, 403 F.Supp. 49, 53 (N.D.Fla. 1975)(If a
party wants the court to look to an extrinsic matter, he must
put that information in proper evidentiary form); See also
North Star International v. Arizona Corp. Commission, 720 F.2d
578, 582 (9th Cir. 1983).

("[I]t becomes apparent that a

motion to dismiss is not automatically converted into a motion
for summary judgment whenever matters outside the pleading
happen to be filed with the Court and not expressly rejected by
the Court.")

Rule 9(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly
provides that M[f]or the purpose of testing the sufficiency of
a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall
be considered like all other averments of material matter."
Where a plaintiff by the allegations of his complaint erects
the bar of the statute of limitatons, a motion to dismiss
should be granted unless the plaintiff has also pleaded any
exception upon which he relies.

See e.g., Kincheloe v. Farmer,

214 F.2d 604, 605 (7th Cir. 1954), cert, denied 348 U.S. 920
(1955); Kaiser Aluminum v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.

677 F.2d

1045 (5th Cir. 1982), cert, denied 459 U.S. 1105 (1983);
Jablons v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1978).
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VIII. THE BUTCHERS' ELECTION TO APPEAL RATHER THAN TO AMEND
THEIR COMPLAINT OPERATES AS A WAIVER OF ANY RELIANCE ON
GILROY'S PURPORTED ABSENCE.

It must be remembered that the Butchers were put on notice
of the statute of limitations defense by the first motion to
dismiss.

See R. at 16-17.

They chose not to plead Gilroy's

alleged absence from the state as an exception to that defense
in their Amended Complaint.

Furthermore, the Butchers declined the opportunity to
further amend their complaint pursuant to Judge Rokich's order
see R. at 83, choosing instead to appeal from that order.

They

in effect chose to stand on their original Amended Complaint
and relinquished the argument they would now assert.

Accord,

Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc., 573 F.2d 429, 432-33
(7th Cir. 1978)(applying Federal Rule 12 (b)(6)).

That

argument therefore can play no part in the testing of that
pleading's sufficiency.
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CONCLUSION

In applying the statutes of limitations, this Court has

In determining the question here presented,
due regard must be given to the purpose and
object of the statute. The law is wise and
beneficial, and its objects sought not to be
defeated by interpretation. It is entitled
to the same respect as other statutes, and
ought to be enforced, not only on the
presumption, arising from lapse of time,
that the debt has been paid, but because it
is essentially a statute of repose. It
affords protection against ancient demands,
whether originally well founde3d or not, and
serves as a warning against the consequences
of laches . . . .
The statute has a
tendency to prevent oppressive charges,
which might be made, almost with impunity,
after a distance of time when the
transaction has faded from memory, or the
evidence has been lost, and to produce
speedier adjustment of accounts and affairs.

See Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P. 1036, 1037-38
(1896)(emphasis added).

As so aptly summarized by the Butchers

themselves in their brief on appeal:

An action based upon a written contract must
be commenced within six years after the
cause of action occurred; see Section
78-12-1, Section 78-12-[23](2), U.C.A.,
1953, as amended. Thus, the cause of action
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had to be initiated on or before April, 1982
(six years after the date of last
performance on April, 1976), unless
respondents engaged in some type of conduct
to extend the statutory period.

Appellants* Brief at 3. As explained above, the Butchers'
Amended Complaint aleeges no claim against R.G.H., Inc.
whatsoever.

The allegations against Gilroy relating to conduct

extending the period are either insufficient as a matter of law
or are not properly before either this Court or the court below,

Both of the orders dismissing the Butchers' Amended
Complaint should be affirmed.

DATED:

July 25, 1985.

CALLISTER & MEBEKER
James R. Holbrook
Steven E. Tyler
Russell C. Kearl

r
By

^r^^-c_yJji
Attorneys for Respondents
Frank K. Gilroy and R.G.H.,
Inc.

GCN0389K
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

It is hereby certified by the undersigned that four (4)
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS FRANK K. GILROY
AND R.G.H., INC. were served by mail, postage fully prepaid,
upon counsel for the appellants:

Marcus G. Theodore
Suite 701 - Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
on this 25th day of July, 1985,
CALLISTER & NEBEKER
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ADDENDUM

-

43

-

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this

day of

October, 1971, by and between Wendell L. Butcher, hereinafter
referred to as "Butcher" and Frank K. Gilroy, hereinafter referred
to as "Gilroy".
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, the above named parties are presently involved in
litigation in the Third Judicial District Court in Case No, 179775,
entitled "Frank K. Gilroy, Plaintiff, vs. Peter M. Lowe, et al.,
Defendants"; and
WHEREAS, both Gilroy and Butcher have claims against each
other and desire to resolve and settle said claims prior to the
final judgment of the Court trying this matter.
NOV*1, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of
the mutual promises of the parties contained herein, the parties
agree as follows :
1.

Gilroy will pay to Butcher the sum of $3S,000 cash, pay-

able within five (5) days of the date of this Agreement.
2.

Butcher hereby acknowledges that the foregoing sum is

received as complete satisfaction of his claim against Frank K.
Gilroy for damages, and hereby waives all claim and interest in and
to the property knovrn as Mountain Dell Estates, which is the subject
matter of the above mentioned litigation.

It is recognized that

Butchers have heretofore elected to abandon any rights under the
contract dated July 26, 1963, relative to the Mountain Dell properties,

37
and shall stipulate that a declaratory judgment may be entered-trhat
they have no interest therein.

Butchers shall further stipulate

the.! the pending Counterclaim by Butchers against Gilroy shall be
dicTusser with prejudice.

Butcher shall quit claim to Gilroy any

and all right, title or interest he may have or claim in and to
the Mountain Dell properties, and the so-called Fisher and Wand
properties.

Butchers and Gilroy shall provide to each other recipro-

cal General Releases of all claims or liabilities to date.

FXHIRIT A

3.

Butcher agrees to obtain approval from the appropriate

county and state authorities foi permission to subdivide the Mountain
Dell property and shall be entitled to a period of 36 months from
the date of this Agreement to obtain such approval.

Gilroy agrees

to execute such documents as owner of the properties as may be
required in order to obtain such approval, provided, however, that
Gilroy shall not be required to expend any funds in connection with
the effort tc obtain said subdivision approval and all costs in connection therewith will be Butcher's expense.

It is understood that

subdivision approval and all development work and expense in order
to obtain approval of a contemplated subdivision of the Mountain Dell
properties shall be the responsibility and at the sole expense of
Butchei . Gilroy shall have no responsibility whatsoever in subdivision approval, or any developmental work and expense in connection
therewith, 01 any subsequent developmental work and expense of any
kind or nature- whatsoever.

Subdivision approval shall mean absolute

approval of the subdivision, including approvals of going forth absolutely for the sale of lots, including but not limited to Health
Department approvals, Uctei Department approvals, Zoning Department
approvals, State Highway approvals, approvals of all governmental
agencies and clearances oi any kind or natuie whatsoever in ordei to
go forward and sell lots without any restrictions of any kind.
14. Buichejr agrees tc employ the fire of Coon. King & Knowlton
or some other conpetent engineering firm mutually agreed upon to assist
him in obtaining the approval of the subdividing of the Mountain Dell
Estate pioperties and to pay all costs in connection therewith and
in addition any legal 02 othei e>>pences necessary to obtain such
approval.

Baichei agrees to follow the recomnendations of such

engineers in obtaining SLJC>, subdivision approval, and it is understood that if tie s'-bdi\_sicn appio\al is not cbtrined by reason of
Butcher's failure to follow the reconnendations of the engineering
firm employed to assist in obtFining subdi\ision anpioval his recovery
from the sale or disposition of the property as hereinafter provided
s"ball be reduced by 10/s.
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5.

In the event the subdivision is approved within 36

months from the date of this Agreement, the first proceeds from
the sale of lots shall be paid to Gilroy until Gilroy has received
the sum of $86,565.58, together with interest thereon from the date
of this Agreement to the date of payment calculated at a rate of 8%
per annum.

Provided, that in the event Gilroy is required to pay

interest on the $35,000 paid to Butcher in connection with this
settlement agreement, Butcher will pay such additional interest
rate, but not more than a total rate of 9% per annum as to the
$35,000.

"First proceeds" shall mean the net proceeds from the

sale of each lot, less escrow fees and expenses of sale.
6.

In the event butcher is unable to obtain subdivision

approval within 36 months frorr the date of this Agreement, then, and
in that event, the Mountain Dell Estares property shall be sold or
disposer of for the best price obtainable, and from the proceeds of
such sale Gilroy and Butcher will receive a proportionate share based
upon the investment of Gilroy in the property of $86,565.58 and the
investment of Butcher in the property of $40,877.43. The sale or disposition shall be conducted within 18 months immediately following
the expiration of the 36 month period set forth in paragraph 3 herein,
and such sale or disposition shall be conducted by Gilroy at a price
to be determined" by Gilroy in his own discretion.
7.

It is understood that Gilro\ or his designated attorney

in fact will execute all documents reasonably necessary in order to
obtain subdivision approval, including but not limited to the Petition
for Subdivision Approval, the application to the State of Utah for
p_rr.iiss.ion to sell subcivioec lands and any other petitions, documents
and/or &g» i ennis \ ith the r.jr.icipalit\ of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
Count\. State of Utah, and/or an\ Subdivisions thereof, provided,
however, in all such documents there shall be a disclosure of the
fact that Gilroy has not undertaken any responsibility or liability
in connection with the approval of the subdivision or any developmental v?ork of any kind or nature whatsoever.
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8.

In the event at any time Gilroy is not satisfied with

the progress being made in connection with the effort to obtain s u b division approval, he shall have the right and option, at his own
expense, to provide additional legal or engineering assistance, but
such assistance will not be chargeable against Butcher *s ultimate
recovery from the sale of the property if the subdivision approval
is not obtained or from the sale of lots if the subdivision approval
is obtained.

In no event shall the providing of such legal or engi-

neering assistance be construed to obligate Gilroy to perform any
of the subdivision or developmental responsibilities herein, nor
excuse Butcher therefrom.
9.

Butcher hereby agrees to defend Gilroy from any claim,

lien or assertion of judgment or other rights as against the Mountain
Dell property or as against Gilroy relative to the Mountain Dell
property, provided, however, that Butcher shall have 'no liability
therewith except to provide and pay for such defense.
10.

It is agreed that Gilroy shall be provided with a copy

of all documents, correspondence or writings which shall be sent or
received in connection with attempts to gain subdivision approval,
developmental work and any other matter inconnection with the Mountain
Dell properties.

Upon request not more often than each six months,

Gilroy shall receive a written status, report and shall have the right
to examine Eutcher's expense record? as to the Mountain Dell property
at any reasonable time.
11.

Butcher agrees not to represent or hold out to any

public official, creditor or any other person that Gilroy is a partner,
joint venturer, or stands in a principal-agent relationship with
Butcher c

Vfnenever Gilroy T s name shall appear in all such documents

there shall be a disclosure of the fa ex that Gilroy has not undertaken any responsibility or liability in connection with the approval
of the subdivision or any developmental work of any kind or nature
whatsoever.
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12.

Butchers herewith waive and abandon any and all claims

as against Gilroy by reason of that certain agreement dated July 26,
1963, between Marlowe Investment Company as Seller and Butchers as
Buyer, and herewith acknowledge that they will assert no claim of
any kind or nature by reason of any acts which at any time have been
occurred by Marlowe Investment Company, or Peter M. Lowe or by reason
of that certain agreement between Gilroy and Lowe dated February 3,
1963.

Butchers, however, reserve all rights and claims against the

defendants Lowe and Marlowe.
13.

An escrow arrangement is contemplated in connection with

this transaction, and the parties agree to pay escrow fees 50% by
each party*

The escrow instructions shall provide for a release of

lots upon peyment to Gilroy of the net proceeds of sales thereof, with
the provision that in no event shall there be any release of lots without payment to Gilroy of the net proceeds in each instance.

Any

property taxes and assessments paid by Gilroy shall be repaid to
Gilroy and shall be added to GilroyTs interest in the proceeds payable
hereunder.

Upon payment of the full balance due to Gilroy, plus

interest, the escrow shall be closed and Gilroy shall convey his
remaining right, title and interest in and to the property to Butcher.
In the event that Gilroy has not been paid all sums due within 12
months after subdivision approval, the escrow agent shall be instructed
to list the properties for sale over the multiple listing bureau of
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, at appraisal value.
14.

Butchers7 rights shall be determined entirely by reason

of this contract, and no other or further agreements exist. Any
modifications of the foregoing agreement shall be in writing signed
by the parties.
15.

It is understood that both parties to this Agreement

are reserving all rights which they have or believe they have against
the defendants Peter M. Lowe, Martha Lowe and Marlowe Investment
Company.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto subscribed
their names the day and year first above written.

rr.NTCiLJ. L. l^iCrili

H. ~!~~GTf.-70V"
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Marcus G. Theodore
Attorney for Plaintiff
Valley Tower, Suite 701
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 359-8622

H-DIXC-^ .

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL L. BUTCHER and IRENE B.
BUTCHER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FRANK K. GILROY, and R.G.H.
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants,

:
:
s
:
:
:
:
:

AMENDED COMPLAINT
Civil No. C84-1826
Judge Leary

COME NOW Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher and
allege as follows:
1.
Wendell L. Butcher and Irene B. Butcher are residents
of the State of Utah.
2.
Frank K. Gilroy is a resident of the State of Utah.
3.
R.G.H., Inc. is a Utah corporation.
4.
On or about October 18, 1971, Wendell L. Butcher,
Irene B. Butcher, and Frank K. Gilroy stipulated to an entry
of an order and judgment as Civil No. 179775. As part of the
stipulation, a settlement agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A.
was entered into. Frank K. Gilroy was to hold title to 33 acres
surrounding Mt. Dell Golf Course subject to the requirement
in paragraph 6 that he sell the property by April, 1976 for the
best price attainable and the proceeds be apportioned with
32% paid to the plaintiffs and 68% paid to the defendant.
5.
Plaintiffs and Frank K. Gilroy attempted to sell the
property over the years but because of various subdivision

EXHIBIT B

development changes and watershed questions, the parties were
delayed in selling the property.
6.
On or about March 8, 1982, within six years of the
performance sale date of April, 1976, Frank K. Gilroy sold the
property in question to R.G.H., Inc. without notifying
plaintiffs or accounting to them for their share of the proceeds.
A copy of the warranty deed is attached hereto as Exhibit B.,
and by this reference incorporated herein.
7.
Plaintiffs continued to attempt to sell the property
and periodically notified Frank K. Gilroy of their progress in
this regard. Frank K. Gilroy at no time notified plaintiffs
that he had sold the property, and continued to encourage
plaintiffs in their efforts to find a buyer and acquire the
necessary building permits from Salt Lake City. Based upon
Frank K. Gilroyfs representation and assurances that he was also
trying to perform the contract, plaintiffs continued to attempt
to sell the property and work with the city to obtain permits
for the property.
8.
To date, Frank K. Gilroy has failed to account to
plaintiffs or pay them the amounts due and owing under the
stipulated agreement as was repeatedly promised.
9.
Plaintiffs therefore request the court to require Frank
K. Gilroy to account for all moneys received and to apportion the
same between the parties under the terms of the stipulated agreement.
In the event Frank K. Gilroy failed to acquire fair market value
for the property, for a judgment against him in the amount of any
deficiency.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:
1.
For the court to require Frank K. Gilroy to account to
plaintiffs for all sums received from the sale of the property.
2.
For judgment to be entered against Frank K. Gilroy
for the amounts due and owing plaintiffs under the stipulated
agreement.
3.
For such other and further relief as the court may
-2-
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deem just and equitable under the premises,
DATED this Jof^day of August, 1984.

20D0RE
MARCUS G. THEODC
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Address of Plaintiffs:
3980 Eldorado Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Amended Complaint was mailed first class postage
prepaid this 16th day of October, 1984 to Steven E. Tyler,
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hansen, 175 South West Temple,
#700, Salt Lake City, UT 84101.

(vl/JU> mudx*

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this

day of

October, 1971, by and between Wendell L. Butcher, hereinafter
referred to as "Butcher" and Frank K. Gilroy, hereinafter referred
to as "Gilroy".
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, the above named parties are presently involved in
litigation in the Third Judicial District Court in Case No. 179775,
entitled "Frank K. Gilroy, Plaintiff, vs. Peter M. Lowe, et al.,
Defendants"; and
WHEREAS, both Gilroy and Butcher have claims against each
other and desire to resolve and settle said claims prior to the
final judgment of the Court trying this matter.
NOV', THEREFOrX, in consideration of the foregoing and of
the mutual promises of the parties contained herein, the parties
agree as f ollov.'S:
1.

Gilroy will pay to Butcher the sum of $35,000 cash, pay-

able within five (S) days of the date of this Agreement.
2.

Butcher hereby acknowledges that the foregoing sum is

received as complete satisfaction of his claim against Frank K.
Gilroy for damages, and hereby waives all claim and interest in and
to the property knovrn as Mountain Dell Estates, which is the subject
matter of the above mentioned litigation.

It is recognized that

Butchers have heretofore elected to abandon any rights under the
contract dated July 26, 1963, relative to the Mountain Dell properties,

37
and shell stipulate that a declaratory judgment may be entered-i:hat
they have no interest therein.

Butchers shall further stipulate

that the pending Counterclaim by Butchers against Gilroy shall be
dismissed with prejudice.

Butcher shall quit claim to Gilroy any

and all right, title or interest he may have or claim in and to
the Mountain Dell properties, and the so-called Fisher and Wand
properties.

Butchers and Gilroy shall provide to each other recipro-

cal General Releases of all claims or liabilities to date*

EXHIBIT A
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3.

Butcher agrees to obtain approval from the appropriate

cejjnty and state authorities for permission to subdivide the Mountain
Dell property and shall be entitled to a period of 36 months from
the date of this Agreement to obtain such approval.

Gilroy agrees

to execute such documents as owner of the properties as may be
required in order to obtain such approval, provided, however, that
Gilroy shall not be required to expend any funds in connection with
the effort tc obtain said subdivision approval and all costs in connection therewith will be Butcher's expense.

It is understood that

subdivision approval and all development work and expense in order
to obtain approval of a contemplated subdivision of the Mountain Dell
properties shall be the responsibility and at the sole expense of
Butchei . Gilroy shall have no responsibility whatsoever in subdivision approval, or any developmental work and expense in connection
therewith, or any subsequent developmental work and expense of any
kind or nature- whatsoever.

Subdivision approval shall mean absolute

approval of the subdivision, including approvals of going forth absolutely for the sale of lots, including but not limited to Health
Department approvals, Water Department approvals, Zoning Department
approvals, State Highway approvals-, approvals of all governmental
agencies and clearances of any kind or nature whatsoever in order to
go forward and sell lots without any restrictions of any kind.
M.

Butcher agrees T C employ the firm of Coon, King & Knowlton

or some other corripetent engineering firm mutually agreed upon to assist
him in obtaining the approval of the subdividing of the Mountain Dell
Estate properties and to pay all costs in connection therewith and
in addition any legal or other expenses necessary to obtain such
approval.

Butcher agrees to follow the recommendations of such

engineers in obtaining such subdivision approval, and it is understood that if the subdivision approval is not obtained by reason of
Butcher's failure to follow the recommendations of the engineering
firm employed to assist in obtaining subdivision approval his recovery
from the sale or disposition of the property as hereinafter provided
s"hall "be reduced by 10?o«
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5.

In the event the subdivision is approved within 36

months from the date of this Agreement, the first proceeds from
the sale of lots shall be paid to Gilroy until Gilroy has received
the sum of $86,565.58, together with interest thereon from the date
of this Agreement to the date of payment calculated at a rate of 8%
per annum.

Provided, that in the event Gilroy is required to pay

interest on the $35,000 paid to Butcher in connection with this
settlement agreement, Butcher will pay such additional interest
rate, but not more than a total rate of 9% per annum as to the
$35,000.

"First proceeds" shall mean the net proceeds from the

sale of each lot, less escrow fees and expenses of sale.
6.

In the event Butcher is unable to obtain subdivision

approval within 36 months from the date of this Agreement, then, and
in that event, the Mountain Dell Estates property shall be sold or
disposed of for the best price obtainable, and from the proceeds of
such sale Gilroy and Butcher will receive a proportionate share based
upon the investment of Gilroy in the property of $86,565.58 and the
investment of Butcher in the property of $40,877.M3. The sale or disposition shall be conducted within 18 months immediately following
the expiration of the 36 month period set forth in paragraph 3 herein,
and such sale or disposition shall be conducted by Gilroy at a price
to be determined by Gilroy in his own discretion.
7.

It is understood that Gilroy or his designated attorney

in fact will execute all documents reasonably necessary in order to
obtain subdivision approval, including but not limited to the Petition
for Subdivision Approval, the application to the State of Utah for
permission to sell subdivided lands and any other petitions, documents
and/or agr-eements with the municipality of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and/or any subdivisions thereof, provided,
however, in all such documents there shall be a disclosure of the
fact that Gilroy has not undertaken any responsibility or liability
in connection with the approval of the subdivision or any developmental -work of any kind or nature whatsoever.

-3-
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B.

In the event at any time Gilroy is not satisfied with

the progress being made in connection with the effort to obtain subdivision approval, he shall have the right and option, at his own
expense, to provide additional legal or engineering assistance, but
such assistance will not be chargeable against Butcher's ultimate
recovery from the sale of the property if the subdivision approval
is not obtained or from the sale of lots if the subdivision approval
is obtained.

In no event shall the providing of such legal or engi-

neering assistance be construed to obligate Gilroy to perforin any
of the subdivision or developmental responsibilities herein, nor
excuse Butcher therefrom.
9.

Butcher hereby agrees to defend Gilroy from any claim,

lien or assertion of judgment or other rights as against the Mountain
Dell property or as against Gilroy relative to the Mountain Dell
property, provided, however, that Butcher shall have no liability
therewith except to provide and pay for such defense.
10.

It is agreed that Gilroy shall be provided with a copy

of all documents, correspondence or writings which shall be sent or
received in connection with attempts to gain subdivision approval,
developmental work and any other matter inconnection with the Mountain
Dell properties.

Upon request not more often than each six months,

Gilroy shall receive a written status report and shall have the right
to examine Butcher's expense records as to the Mountain Dell property
at any reasonable time.
11.

Butcher agrees not to represent or hold out to any

public official, creditor or any other person that Gilroy is a partner,
joint venturer, or stands in a principal-agent relationship with
Butcher.

Whenever Gilroy1s name shall appear in all such documents

there shall be a disclosure of the j£:ct that Gilroy has not undertaken any responsibility or liability in connection with the approval
of the subdivision or any developmental work of any kind or nature
whatsoever.
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12.

Butchers herewith waive and abandon any and all claims

as against Gilroy by reason of that certain agreement dated July 26,
1963, between Marlowe Investment Company as Seller and Butchers as
Buyer, and herewith acknowledge that they will assert no claim of
any kind or nature by reason of any acts which at: any time have been
occurred by Marlowe Investment Company, or Peter M. Lowe or by reason
of that certain agreement between Gilroy and Lowe dated February 3,
1963.

Butchers, however, reserve all rights and claims against the

defendants Lowe and Marlowe.
13.

An escrow arrangement is contemplated in connection with

this transaction, and the parties agree to pay escrow fees 50% by
each partyc

The escrow instructions shall provide for a release of

lots upon peyment to Gilioy of the net proceeds of sales thereof, with
the provision that in no event shall there be any release of lots without payment to Gilroy of the net proceeds in each instance. Any
property taxes and assessments paid by Gilroy shall be repaid to
Gilroy and shall be added tc Gilroy1s interest in the proceeds payable
hereunder*

Upon payment of the full balance due to Gilroy, plus

interest, the escrow shall be closed and Gilroy shall convey his
remaining right, title and interest in and to the property to Butcher.
In the event that Gilroy has not been paid all sums due within 12
months after subdivision approval, the escrow agent shall be instructed
to list the properties for sale ovei the multiple listing bureau of
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, at appraisal value.
14.

Butchers1 rights shall be determined entirely by reason

of this contract, and no other or further agreements exist. Any
modifications of the foregoing agreement shall be in writing signed
by the parties.
15.

It is understood that both pdrties to this Agreement

are reserving all rights which they have or believe they have against
the defendants Peter M. Lowe, Martha Lowe and Marlowe Investment
Company.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto subscribed
their names the cay and year first above written.

\T.N7>:.L1. L. U-iCKL!
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WARRANTY DEED
(SfMdsl)

FRAMK I . GILROY
of

Las Vegas He\ada

Cowrrr

fp

a m w'aasAar

*7.

R.G.H., IMC* f
3604 Astro Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Otah

smmef

Ten and No/100
• •• • — — ••• • •„-..,, •• •. • •• • ->«•noiiAis,
and other good and valuable consideration
Coenrjr,
the following omcriboi tact ellssd m
Salt Lake
i i Scat* of Utah:
i I
The Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section
11, Township 1 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
EXCEPTING such documents as may refer to the rights of way
of Salt Lake and Eastern Railroad, Utah Central Railroad,
Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Companies, Knight Power
Company, -the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
and Salt Lake County, but which do not definitely locate said
rights of way in connection with said property.
Sibject to all current taxes, easements, restrictions and
rights of way of record or enforceable in law or equity.

WITNESS, tne h a d

T*t

of mud
,A.D. If ?X

dsyof

Signed in tmt

§ TV, 1 *
STATE Or UTAH,

County of Salt Lake
Oats*
Tt£

h

>-*

£*=!
looc

t*

Frank K. G i l r o y

mm**
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GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
JAMES R. HOLBROOK (A-1516)
STEVEN E. TYLER (A-3301)
RUSSELL C. KEARL (A-1780)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 531-7676
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

WENDELL L. BUTCHER and
IRENE B. BUTCHER,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H.,
INC.f a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C 84-1826
Judge John H. Rokich

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

Defendant R.G.H., Inc.'s motion to dismiss came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable John H. Rokich on
Monday, February 25, 1985 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.

Plaintiffs

were represented by Marcus G. Theodore and defendant R.G.H.,
was represented by Steven L. Tyler.

Based upon defendant's

motion and the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing
therefore,

nwwr c

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the action filed against
defendant R.G.H., Inc. is hereby dismissed without prejudice
because the complaint filed herein fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
/1*~ day of

DATED this

/ty £ n

, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINOLEY
->S7

By

—\f

(L

V /

^1 I:
^

^ y N ^ ^ J o h i jiy Rokich
Court Judge
potior**
aaZ^lQM^hiJod D i s t r i c t

C^OJuL

[! Approved as to Form:

By ^ ^

y._

"Marcus G. Theodore,
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s

Date

Date / Q b , &*!.
Steven E. Tyler>
A t t o r n e y for D^

l<t*S

''"•>•• U T A H

i GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER
JAMES R. HOLBROOK (A-1516)
STEVEN E. TYLER (A-3301)
RUSSELL C. KEARL (A-1780)
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 531-7676

C> ri

i£RK

uf.ya QUI

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

I! WENDELL L. BUTCHER and
|; IRENE B. BUTCHER,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,

!

v.

I FRANK K. GILROY and R.G.H.,
INC., a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C 84-1826
Judge John H. Rokich

Defendants
* * * * * * *

The motion of defendants Frank K. Gilroy and R.G.K.,
jl Inc., to dismiss the above-titled action for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted by reason that all
claims made therein are barred by the appropriate statute of
limitations, came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
John H. Rokich on Monday, February 25, 1985 at 10:00 o'clock
a.m.

Plaintiffs were represented by Marcus G. Theodore and
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defendants were represented by Steven E. Tyler.

Based upon the

arguments of counsel and the Court's review of the memoranda
filed herein, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

All claims alleged in the plaintiffs1 First Amended

Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice because they are
barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

See Utah Code

Ann., Section 78-12-23 (Repl. 1977).
2.

In the event that plaintiffs have not filed an Amended

Complaint stating a claim against defendants which is not barred
by the statute of limitations on or before March 11, 1985, this
action is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED THIS

/'JL

day of

Alair^Uw

, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H DJXON-WJNDLEY

Oeputy Gleric

i'cdL^

KK^HZ^JL

.John A. R o k i c h ,
¥hird District Court Judge

Approved a s t o Form:

Date
M a r c u s G. Theodore,
Attorney for Plaintiffs

By

<Sk

Date ?&0t £H}

14&S

3"bertfen E. Ty
A t t o r n e y f o r Def

8(3
-2-

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 9. Docketing Statement
(a) Time for Filing. Within 21 days after the notice of appeal or petition for
review is filed, the appellant, or the petitioner, shall file a docketing statement
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. An original and 7 copies shall be filed,
together with proof of service.
(b) Purpose of Docketing Statement The docketing statement is not a brief
and should not contain arguments or procedural motions. It it to be used by the
Court in classifying cases, making summary disposition, and making calendar
assignments.
(c) Content of Docketing Statement The docketing statement shall contain
the following information in the order set forth below:
(1) the authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the Court to hear the
appeal or petition for review, or in the case of an interlocutory appeal, the
date of the Court order allowing the appeal and the issues which may be
appealed pursuant to the granting of an interlocutory appeal In
multi-party or multi-issue cases, particular attention should be paid to
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(2) a concise statement of the nature of the proceeding, e.g., this appeal
is from a final order of the district court, or this petition is for review of
an order of an administrative agency;
(3) the date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; the date of
any order respecting a motion pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; and the date the notice of appeal or petition for
review was filed;
(4) a concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the questions presented;
/ •
(5) the issues presented by the appeal, expressed in terms and circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary detail. The questions should
not be repetitious. General conclusory statements such as 'the judgment
of the trial court is not supported by the law or facts" are not acceptable;
(6) any statutes, rules, or cases believed to be determinative of the
respective issues stated;
(7) a reference to all related or prior appeals in the case. If the reference
is to a prior appeal, the appropriate citation should be given.
(d) Necessary Attachments. Attached to each copy of the docketing
statement shall be a copy of the following:
(1) the judgment or order sought to be reviewed;
(2) any opinion or findings; and
(3) the notice of appeal and a copy of any order extending the time for
the filing of a notice of appeal.
(e) Consequences of Failure to Comply. Docketing statements which fail to
comply with this Rule will not be accepted. Failure to comply may result in
dismissal of the appeal or petition.
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This Rule is derived from former Rule 73A,
URCivP and is similar to Rule 8 U.S. Tenth
Circuit Court with minor changes. The time for
filing the docketing statement is changed from
15 days to 21 days after the notice of appeal is
filed, and the number of copies to be filed was
increased from 6 to an original and 7. Paragraph headings also have been added for ease of
reference.
The principal objective of this Rule is to
require counsel for the appellant to immediately focus upon and frame the issues to be
addressed in the appeal, and thereby assist the
Supreme Court in making calendar

assignments, classifying cases, and ruling on
summary disposition motions under Rule 10.
Additionally, docketing statements enhance
the Court's ability to identify jurisdictional
defects, monitor pending appeals and to identify at the initial stages those appeals which
involve complex and/or multiple issues
requiring more detailed consideration.
The content of the docketing statement and
requisite attachments are set forth in detail in
paragraphs (c) and (d), irespectively. Paragraph
(e) is explicit that a failure to comply with this
Rule may result in dismissal of the appeal.
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Rule 11. The Record on Appeal.
(a) Composition of the Record on Appeal The original papers and exhibits
filed in the district court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, and the index
prepared by the clerk of the district court shall constitute the record on appeal
in all cases. However with respect to papers and exhibits, only those prescribed
under paragraph (d) of this Rule shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
(b) Pagination and Indexing of the Record. Immediately upon filing of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the district court shall prepare an index of all of
the original papers filed in the district court, and shall paginate those papers
in chronological order.
(c) Duty of Appellant After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply with
the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Rule and shall take any other
action necessary to enable the clerk to assemble and transmit the record. A
single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers and Exhibits on Appeal.
(1) Criminal Cases. All of the original papers in a criminal case shall be
included by the clerk of the district court as part of the record on appeal.
(2) Civil Cases. In all civil cases, the record shall remain in the custody
of the clerk of the district court, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2), during
preparation and filing of briefs.
The district court clerk shall establish rules and procedures for checking
out the record, after pagination, for use by the parties in briefing.
(A) Civil Cases with Short Records. In civil cases where all the
original papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of the original papers will
be transmitted to the Supreme Court upon completion of the filing of
briefs by the parties, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2). In such cases, the
appellant shall serve a notice upon the clerk of the district court, simultaneous with the filing of appellant's reply brief with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, of the date in which appellant's reply brief wasfiled;if
appellant does not intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the
clerk of the district court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of
respondent's brief with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
(B) All Other Civil Cases. In all other civil cases where the original
papers are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of the
district court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or
separate designation of those papers referred to in their respective
briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to the extent
applicable, shall be transmitted to the Clerk of the Supreme Court by the
clerk of the district court:
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(ii) the pretrial order, if any;
(iii) thefinaljudgment, order, or interlocutory orderfromwhich the
appeal is taken;
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any;
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of law
filed or delivered by the trial court;
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(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon
which the court rendered judgment, if any;
(vii) jury instructions given, if any;
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any;
(ix) the notice of appeal.
(e) The Transcript of Proceedings; Duty of Appellant to Order: Notice to
Respondent if Partial Transcript is Ordered.
(1) Request for Transcript; Time for Filing. Within 10 days after filing
the notice of appeal the appellant shall request from the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as he deems
necessary. The request shall be in writing and within the same period a
copy shall be filed with the clerk of the district court. If no such parts of
the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the appellant
shall file a certificate to that effect.
(2) Transcript Required of all Evidence Regarding Challenged Finding
or Conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, he shall
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding
or conclusion.
(3) Statement of Issues; Cross-Designation by Respondent Unless the
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days after
filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues he intends to
present on the appeal and shall serve on the respondent a copy of the
request or certificate and of the statement. If the respondent deems a
transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, he shall, within
10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the statement of
the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation of additional
parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts, and has so notified the
respondent, the respondent may within the following 10 days either
request the parts or move in the district court for an order requiring the
appellant to do so.
(4) Payment of Reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall make
satisfactory arrangements with the reporter for payment of the cost of the
transcript.
(f) Agreed Statement as the Record on Appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal
as defined in paragraph (a) of this Rule, the parties may prepare and sign a
statement of the case showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and
were decided in the district court and setting forth only so many of the facts
averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision of the
issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such
additions as the court may consider necessary fully to present the issues raised
by the appeal, shall be approved by the district court and transmitted by the
district court clerk to the Clerk of the Supreme Court as the record on appeal
within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The index shall be transmitted to
the Supreme Court by the clerk of the district court upon approval by the
district court of the statement.

(g) Statement of the Evidence or Proceedings When no Report was Made or
When the Transcript is Unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings
at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant
may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedingsfromthe best available
means, including his recollection. The statement shall be served on the
respondent, who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto within
10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any objections or proposed
amendments shall be submitted to the district court for settlement and
approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the clerk of the
district court in the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or Modification of the Record. If any difference arises as to
whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omittedfromthe
record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation,
or the district court, or the Supreme Court, either before or after the record is
transmitted to the Supreme Court, on proper suggestion or of its own initiative,
may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary
that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or
the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a
statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service any party may
serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and
content of the record shall be presented to the Supreme Court.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Rules 11, 12, and 13 govern the preparation
and transmission of the record on appeal. They
involve substantial departuresfromprior Utah
practice. Rules 10, 11, and 12 FRAP, were the
starting point but the final product is largely
the Committees original work.
Paragraph (a). This paragraph provides that
the record on appeal includes all of the original
papers filed in the district court, the index of
the papers, and the transcript, if any. No new
record is to be prepared for the appeal and the
Supreme Court can rely on any material contained in the district court's original file.
Paragraph (b). As soon as a notice of appeal
is filed, the district court clerk is required to
paginate all of the papers in the file and prepare
an index of them. Under paragraph (d) of this
Rule and paragraph (b) of Rule 12, the papers
and exhibits in civil cases will remain in the
custody of the district court clerk until after
briefing is completed. Pagination and indexing
allows for the orderly handling of papers and
will take place as to the entire court file, even
though in cases of 300 or more pages, all the
papers will not be transmitted to the Supreme
Court.
Paragraph (c). Appellant's obligations do not
cease with the filing of a notice of appeal. Each
appellant is required to comply with the transcript provisions of paragraph (e), and assist the
clerk, when necessary, to - assemble and
transmit the record.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph is a substantial departurefromprior practice under Rule 75
URCivP.
In criminal cases, and in civil cases with
records of fewer than 300 pages, all of the
original papers filed in the district court will be
transmitted to the Supreme Court at the appro-

priate time. In criminal cases, the appropriate
time is as soon as the transcript, if any, is completed and filed with the district court clerk
under Rule 12(a). If there is no transcript, the
papers are to be transmitted within 20 days of
the filing of the notice of appeal. See Rule
12(bXl). The result is that in criminal cases, the
original papers and transcript will be in the
custody of the Clerk of the Supreme Court
during the briefing period.
In civil cases where the record is less than
300 pages, all of the original papers in the file
will be transmitted to the Supreme Court Clerk
within 20 days after the appellant hasfiledhis
reply brief on appeal with the Supreme Court or
if appellant elects not to file a reply brief;
within 30 days of the filing of respondent's brief
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. See Rule
11(d)(2)(A), Rule 12(b)(2). The appellant has an
obligation under paragraph (a) to notify the
clerk of the district court, simultaneously with
the filing of appellant's reply brief, of the date
in which the reply brief wasfiledwith the Clerk
of the Supreme Court, or if appellant does not
file a reply brief, to notify the clerk of the district court of that fact within 30 days of the
filing of respondent's brief in the Supreme
Court.
In civil cases with records of 300 pages or
more, only a portion of the original papers will
be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
Transmission of these papers, like transmission
of the papers in civil cases with short records,
will occur only after briefing is completed. The
parties must, after briefing is completed, file
with the district court clerk a designation of the
papers referred to in their briefs. The matters
designated by the parties, along with the
mandatory items listed in paragraph (dX2XB),

will then be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
In all events the transcript stays with the
original papers and will be transmitted with
them to the Supreme Court.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph governs the
ordering of the transcript of proceedings. It is
each appellant's responsibility to order such
portions of the proceedings as are necessary for
a full consideration of the issues which he
intends to raise on appeal. If the appellant
orders a transcript of less than the entire proceedings he must file and serve on the
respondent a statement of the issues he intends
to raise on appeal and a copy of his request for
a partial transcript. This is to enable the
respondent to consider whether the partial
transcript adequately covers the issues which
are raised by the appellant. If, in the
respondent's view, the partial transcript is
insufficient, he may request that the appellant
include additional portions of the proceedings.
If the appellant fails to do so, the respondent
may either move in the district court for an
order compelling the appellant to do so or the
respondent may order the additional parts
himself.

Paragraph (f). The agreed statement provides
an alternative to the ordinary procedures for
preparation and transmittal of the record. If the
parties choose to use em agreed statement, it
shall be submitted to the district court for
approval and, if approved, transmitted to the
Supreme Court in place of the ordinary record
after briefing and in accordance with Rule
12(b)(2).
Paragraph (g). This paragraph applies
whenever a transcript of the proceedings is
unavailable.
Paragraph (h). This paragraph applies
whenever there is a question as to whether the
transcript or the original papers accurately
reflect what occurred in the district court.
These disputes should usually be submitted to
the district court since it will ordinarily be in
the best position to ascertain the correctness of
the record. Under unusual circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for such a dispute to
be submitted to the Supreme Court, or for the
district court or the Supreme Court to act on its
own motion. In any event, all parties shall be
given notice of proposed changes in the record
and an opportunity to object to them.
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Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the Appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order here indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the
caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The
list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside
the cover.
(2) A table of contents, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, agency rules, Court rules, statutes and other authorities
cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A statement of the issues presented for review.
(5) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of provision is lengthy,
the citation alone will suffice and in that event, the provision shall be set
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this Rule.
(6) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see paragraph (e)).
(7) Summary of arguments. A summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading
under which the argument is arranged.
(8) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.
(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of the Respondent. The brief of the respondent shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this Rule, except that a statement of the
issues or of the case need not be made unless the respondent is dissatisfied with
the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply Brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
respondent, and if the respondent has cross-appealed, the respondent may file
a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set
forth in the opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of
Court.
(d) References in Briefs to Parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "respondent." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names
of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the iiyured person,"
"the taxpayer," etc.
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(e) References in Briefs to the Record. References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of the
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, and
received or rejected.
(f) Reproduction of Statutes, Rules, Regulations, Documents, Etc. If determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under
subparagraph (a)(4) of this Rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the Court in pamphlet form.
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document
subject to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the addendum.
(g) Length ofBriefs. Except by permission of the Court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (f) of this Rule.
(h) Briefs in Cases Involving Cross-Appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing his notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this Rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
Court otherwise orders. The brief of the respondent shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in his appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the
appellant.
(i) Briefs in Cases Involving Multiple Appellants or Respondents. In cases
involving more than one appellant or respondent, including cases consolidated
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or respondent may adopt by reference any part of the brief of
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after his brief has been filed, or
after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the Clerk
of the Court, by letter, with a copy of all counsel, setting forth the citations.
There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued
orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument
state the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made
within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and Sanctions. All briefs under this Rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the Court, and/or the Court may assess attorney's fees against the offending
lawyer.
(1) Brief Covers. The covers of all briefs shall comply with Rule 27. Cover
material shall be heavyweight paper.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This Rule is based on Rule 28 FRAP, with ordinances and regulations involved in the case
certain modifications. It differs significantly be quoted verbatim, unless they are unduly
from prior Rule 75(p)(2) URCivP.
lengthy. In that event, they shall be cited and
Inadequate appellate briefs which do not sig- included in the addendum provided for by paranificantly assist the Court in disposing of the graph (f).
case before it have proven to be a significant
Paragraph (aXS). This paragraph requires all
problem. In order to alleviate this concern, this statements of proceedings and facts to be supRule clearly specifies the required contents and ported by references to the record. The prior
order of each brief. Under paragraph (k), briefs rule contained a similar requirement, but was
which do not comply with the requirements of frequently disregarded in practice. This rule is
the rule or are otherwise inadequate may be intended to emphasize that such citations are
disregarded or stricken by the Court. The Court required in all cases. See also paragraph (e).
may also assess attorney's fees against the
Paragraph (aX7). This paragraph requires a
non-complying lawyers.
summary of the argument in all cases. This
Paragraph (a)(1). This paragraph requires departure from Rule 24 FRAP was made
that the brief include a complete list of all because such summaries were found to be of
parties if they are not reflected in the caption of substantial assistance to the Court.
the case in order to permit the Court to identify
Paragraph tf).*The provision for an addenand evaluate potential conflicts of interest.
dum has no counterpart in prior practice.
Paragraph (g). The limit of 50 pages for the
Paragraph (a)(4). Unlike prior Rule 75(p)(2)
URCivP., this paragraph expressly requires a opening brief of appellant and respondent's
"statement of the issues" presented for review. answering brief is the same as under prior Utah
The requirement is regarded by the Committee practice, Rule 75(p)(2) URCivP. The 25-page
limit on reply briefs differs from prior Utah
as particularly important.
Paragraph (a)(5). This paragraph requires practice and coincides with the page limitation
that constitutional provisions, statutes, under Rule 28(g) FRAP.
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Rule 8. General Rules of Pleadings.
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain
(l)a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself
entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he
may generally deny all the averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend to controvert
all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the obligations set
forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect ofFailure to Deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading
to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(0 Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.

EXHIBIT H
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Rule 9. Pleading Special Matters.
(a) (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that
is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal
existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall
do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting
particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and on such
issue the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall
establish the same on the trial.
(2) Designation of Unknown Defendant When a party does not know
the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and
thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse
party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.
(3) Actions to Quiet Title; Description of Interest of Unknown Parties.
In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated in the
caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown persons
as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest
in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the
complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto."
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions Precedent In pleading the performance or occurrence of
conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so made
the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish
the facts showing such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official Document or Act. In pleading an official document or act it is
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance
with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign
court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient
to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with
particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision
shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts.
(f) Time and Place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading,
averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other
averments of material matter.
(g) Special Damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall
be specifically stated.
(h) Statute of Limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally
that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on,
referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section
number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision
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relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted,
the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing
that the cause of action is so barred.
(i) Private Statutes; Ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state,
or an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from
such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance
by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The court shall
thereupon take judicial notice thereof.
(j) Libel and Slander.
(1) Pleading Defamatory Matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel
or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the
plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it is
sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging
such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so
published or spoken.
(2) Pleading Defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the
defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory
and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and,
whether he proves the justification or not. he may give in evidp^ft the
mitigating circumstances.
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Rule 12. Defenses and Objections.

*

*

*

*

(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or feet, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack ofjurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, he may
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
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